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Abstrak 
 Kemampuan menyelesaikan kasus hukum adalah topik yang 
krusial dalam hukum Islam terutama dalam konteks status 
personal. Qur‟an menyinggung hal ini dalam surat an-Nisa ayat 
506. Namun dalam ayat tersebut hanya membahas kemampuan 
hukum yang dikaitkan dengan anak yatim dan belum dewasa. 
Terkait dengan hal tersebut, para ahli hukum zaman klasik Islam 
mencoba untuk memahami apa yang dimaksud dengan kemampuan 
hukum dan mempraktekanya dalam masyarakat muslim. Salah satu 
ahli hukum terkenal yang mencoba mengkaji ini adalah Ibn Rushd, 
dalam bukunya Fatawa, Ibn Rushd membahas mengenai isu 
kecakapan atau kemampuan hukum. Hal ini dibahas nya karena 
diajukan oleh seseorang ketika ia menjabat sebagai hakim di 
Seville dan Cordoba.  
 
Kata Kunci: Ibn Rushd, kecakapan hukum, status personal, 
muslim Spanyol 
 
 
Abstract 
Legal capacity is one of the major topics in Islamic law on 
personal status. The Qurʾān deals with this subject, for example in 
Q 4: 5-6. However, it only discusses the issue of legal capacity in 
relation to orphans and minors. Based on the loose Qurʾānic 
concept of orphans and minors, the jurists of the classical period 
attempted to understand what was meant by legal capacity in Islam 
and how ought to operated in a Muslim society. One of the most 
remarkable jurists who tackled this issue was Ibn Rushd 
(520/1126-595-1198). In his celebrated collection of fatwā, the 
Fatāwā Ibn Rushd, he explored the issue of legal capacity based on 
“Ibn Rushd As Jurist” and  His Fatwā            75                           Fachrizal A. Halim 
on Legal Capacity 
questions brought to him, who at a time sit as a qāḍī in Sevilla and 
Cordoba.  
 
Keywords: Averroes, legal capacity, personal status, 
guardianship, Muslim Spain 
 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
Abu al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn 
Rushd al-Qurṭubi al-Mālikī, known in the Medieval West by the 
Latinized name of Averroes, is famous in modern academia as a 
master of natural sciences (physics, medicine, biology, astronomy), 
theology, and philosophy. He was born in Cordova in 520/1126 and 
died in Marrākush in 595/1198. His significant commentaries on 
Plato and Aristotle have led modern scholars to designate him as 
“the commentator of Aristotle.”2 His stunning career in philosophy, 
natural sciences and theology, however, did not lead him to 
approach philosophy and religion as two distinct domains. On the 
contrary, Ibn Rushd was a Muslim thinker who advocated the 
importance of philosophy in acquiring an understanding of the 
world, relationships between individuals, and the structure of 
society. Ibn Rushd certainly was aware that there was a huge gulf 
between theoretical issues of theology and philosophy on one hand, 
and the practical issues of law on the other. In fact, in some of his 
commentaries, Ibn Rushd seems active in harmonizing philosophy 
and religion, or more specifically, in blending moral society into 
the sharīʿa.3 Yet, it is on this latter issue that Ibn Rushd has been 
overlooked by modern scholars. Hence, serious attempts to look at 
his legal discourse are highly significant for the study of Islamic 
legal history as well as the study of law and society today.  
Insofar as the issue of Ibn Rushd‟s legal discourse and career 
is concerned, there has only been three serious works written to 
date: Brunschvig‟s “Averroès Juriste,” published four decades ago; 
Dominique Urvoy‟s monograph, which contains some discussion 
of Ibn Rushd‟s career as a jurist; and an unpublished 1991 doctoral 
thesis by Asadullah Yate from Cambridge University, which 
highlights Ibn Rushd career as a jurist in the Mālikī school of law.4 
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Although Ibn Rushd has written volumes on uṣūl, and was himself 
an appointed qāḍī in Seville and Cordoba, his treatises on legal 
discourse remain nearly unnoticed in academia because of the 
propensity of scholars to study his works on philosophy and 
theology.
5
 The indifference of modern scholars toward Ibn Rushd‟s 
discussion of Islamic law may have a direct correlation with the 
modern scholars‟ lack of interest in studying the legal history of the 
Muslims in Spain.  
Regardless of this paucity, historical records have sufficiently 
confirmed that Ibn Rushd was an expert not only in philosophy and 
theology (kalām), but also in interpreting God‟s law. We are told 
that during his peak position as state-appointed qāḍī, he enjoyed 
the position the most learned man in Andalus. His legal works, 
Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa nihāyat al-muqtaṣid and the fatwa 
collection known as the Fatāwā Ibn Rushd, are masterpiece that 
became the subject of study and memorization among students of 
Islamic law. These two attest that Ibn Rushd was not only a 
speculative thinker, but also a jurist, and to some extent, a mujtahid 
within the Māikī school of law, who was very concerned with the 
practical needs of his society.
6
 
In this article, I attempt to bridge the gap between the much-
studied aspects of his philosophical and theological thought and the 
unelaborated aspects of his juristic career in the Mālikī school of 
law, as well as to explore the issue of legal capacity as it pertained 
to the Muslims of Andalus. 
 
B. A Brief History of Muslim in Spain  
Before we move on, it is worthwhile to briefly look at Ibn 
Rushd‟s historical context in Medieval Spain. Muslims of Andalus 
are a mosaic of Muslim umma that have a different historical 
foundation from the rest of the Eastern Muslim community. What 
is interesting here is that despite the Muslims of Spain experienced 
many conflicts and were faced with continuous anti-Islamic forces, 
they remained loyal to the Mālikī school of law (madhhab). Some 
scholars argue that the option to be loyal to „the people of Medina‟ 
was chosen because of the straightforward theoretical solutions to 
social problems offered by Mālikī‟s doctrine.7 Historical records, 
however, show that the allegiance of the Muslims in Spain to the 
Mālikī school was more pragmatic in nature: the Mālikī school was 
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chosen by the Ummayyad dynasty in a bid to gain support from the 
ʿulamāʾ for the newly established caliphate. In this case, there are 
copious historical records on the arrival of Muslims in Andalus, 
especially from the early conquest of the Iberian Peninsula under 
the Umayyad caliph in Syria, al-Walīd. One record claims that the 
conquered were led by the governor of Ifriqiyya Mūsā b. Nuṣayr 
and his military commander, Ṭāriq. Following the political 
turbulence in Damascus and the threat of persecution of the 
Abbasid, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān the successor of al-Walīd escaped Syria 
to the peninsula and established an Umayyad caliphate there.
8
 
When ʿAbd al-Raḥmān I established an independent 
government in Cordoba on May 15, 756, he knew that his political 
authority was not as strong as the political authority of the Abbasid 
caliphate in Baghdad. Therefore, in order to ensure the continuity 
of his command in the peninsula, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān needed full 
support not only from the Umayyad clients (mawālī banī Umayya) 
and the Islamized Barber, but also from the class of learned 
Muslims. That is to say, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān wanted to gain the 
ʿulamāʾ‟s legitimacy for the newly-created state, because he 
recognized that only the ʿulamāʾ, who had direct influence on the 
masses, could assure him that his justice and attachment to the faith 
would be respected.
9
 Furthermore, the policy of aligning power 
with the ʿulamāʾ, or to use their moral standard in legitimizng the 
government, found it finest form during the time of Hishām I, the 
successor of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān I, whose interest in fiqh led him to 
befriend the pupils of Mālik b. Anas, such as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. 
al-Qāsim and the aṣḥāb of Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.10 
In the Abbasid context in the East, it is generally known that 
during Harun al-Rashīd, the disciples of Mālik in Baghdad and 
Medina desired the teaching of their master to be the official rite of 
the state. However, Mālik himself was reluctant to support the 
caliph because of his policy toward the Alīds, whom the people of 
Medina held in high esteem. The denunciation of Mālik‟s 
involvement in caliph administration, nonetheless, did not 
obliterate the desire of his students to use his teachings as official 
law. When the ruler of the West offered a way to realize Mālik‟s 
standard of behavior and jurisprudence as official rite of the people 
of Andalus, the pupil of Mālik readily accepted the offer. In other 
words, the establishment of Mālik juristic discourse in Andalus was 
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made possible because of the ruler‟s interest in gaining the support 
of the ʿulamāʾ, as well as the ʿulamāʾ‟s desire to apply their 
concept of ideal society and jurisprudence within the Umayyad 
state. However, we must bear in mind that the development of 
Mālik doctrine in Andalus was not without problems. Before being 
overruled by Mālik‟s disciples, Andalus had previously opted for 
the doctrine of the Syrian jurist al-Awzāʿī. The competition 
between al-Awzāʿī and Mālik eventually came to an end after the 
former died in 157/774, and that legal problem could no longer be 
referred to him. Mālik, on the other hand, only died after 179/795.11 
 
C. Legal Capacity in Islamic Law 
In his book An Introduction to Islamic Law (1982), Joseph 
Schacht suggests that legal capacity in Islamic law begins with 
birth and ends with death. Following this reasoning, the child or 
even the unborn child has the capacity to inherit, or in the case of a 
slave, she/he can be manumitted, but she/he would never have the 
capacity to dispose of his/her wealth or have the ability to contract 
unless they fulfilled certain conditions. Schacht has also 
distinguished two elements of legal capacity: the capacity of 
obligation (ahliyyat al-wujūb), which means the capacity to acquire 
rights and duties; and the capacity of execution (ahliyyat al-adā‟), 
which includes the capacity to contract, and to fulfill one‟s 
obligation.
12
 
However, to gain full legal capacity, a Muslim man or a 
woman must first fulfill certain conditions. Schacht explains that 
several prerequisites must be met before one is considered having 
full legal capacity: sanity (ʿāqil) and being of age (bāligh); he must 
also be fully responsible (mukallaf).
13
 The insane (majnūn), small 
children (ṭifl), the idiot (maʿtūh), and the minor (ṣabī, ṣaghīr)are 
considered wholly incapable, but can incur certain financial 
obligations. They also have the capacity to conclude purely 
advantageous transactions and accept donations and charitable 
gifts.
14
 
In addition to these conditions identified by Schacht, another 
important requirement that is no less significant in the discussion of 
legal capacity is the condition of safah. Ibn Manẓūr al-Ifrīqī, in his 
celebrated Lisān al-ʿArab, mentions the wide usage of the term 
safah in diverse contexts relating to ignorance (jahl), shallowness 
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(khiffa), and lack of responsibility and understanding (naqṣ al-
ʿaql).15 Due to a possible broad interpretation, Muslim scholars 
since the early centuries of Islam have offered different opinions on 
the definition of who are the irresponsible or the ignorant (al-safīh). 
They have not reached a consensus on determining what the legal 
implications would be for someone who is considered al-safīh. 
Saʿid b. Jubayr was of the opinion that al-safīh (plural al-sufahāʾ) 
are orphans.
16
 Similarly, Saḥnūn mentioned that minors, whether 
orphans or not, also fall in the category of al-safīh.17 Other scholars 
claim that women are al-sufahāʾ.18 A more specific reference to 
safah was made by Ibn Ḥazam, a former Shāfiʿī jurist who then 
became an independent-minded follower of the Ẓāhirī school of 
law in Andalus. He was of the opinion that al-safīh refers to „bad 
languages,‟ „the obstinate infidel,‟ and „the minor or insane.‟19 
Ibn Rushd, on the other hand, employs the term safah in the 
narrow context of financial mismanagement, particularly referring 
to someone who is irresponsible and undervalues his own wealth.
20
 
Based on the Qur‟anic passage Q 4:5; “Do not give the wealth 
which God granted you in support to the responsible (al-sufahāʾ); 
feed them from it and cloth them, and speak to them in good 
parlance,” Ibn Rushd believes this implies that a man or woman 
who has reached majority (bulūgh) can be regarded as a safīh if 
he/she is found financially irresponsible or is a spendthrift 
(mubadhdhir).
21
 
 
D. Legal Capacity in Ibn Rushd’s view 
In the anthology of fatwā collected by Mukhtār b. al-Ṭāhir al-
Talīlī, Ibn Rushd does not explicitly mention legal capacity as an 
operative term in his corpus of Islamic law as Schacht has 
defined.
22
 However, the absence of this term by no means reduces 
his concern for discussing the issue of legal capacity in a 
comprehensive way. With no abstract operative term to be defined, 
Ibn Rushd goes on to discuss the topic of legal capacity by pointing 
out on particular cases. As is his general pattern, before explaining 
his fatwā, Ibn Rushd always begins his discussion with questions, 
which were either directly brought to him or had been addressed by 
other jurist. In the following discussion of legal capacity, Ibn 
Rushd begins his fatwā by responding to the general concern 
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surrounding the circumstances in which a person is to be allowed 
(jawwaza) to dispose of his/her wealth.  
For Ibn Rushd, an individual has to reach certain points 
before he/she has the legal capacity to use his/her money (lā yaṣiḥ 
li al-insāni fī mā lahu illa bi ʿarbaʿa awṣāf):  he/she must have 
reached puberty or maturity (al-bulūgh), must be free (al-ḥuriya),  
as well as sound of mind (kamāl al-ʿaql) and has exhibited 
responsible behavior (bulūgh al-rashid).23 
Regarding the status of freedom (al-ḥuriya), Ibn Rushd refers 
to the status of slaves and their relationships to their master. In 
Islamic law, it is a legal fact that a slave is usually considered an 
object subject to his master.  However, as Schacht has brought up, a 
slave is still to be considered a person, and therefore can be a 
possessor of rights: she/he can get married (the male slave can 
marry up to two female slaves).
24
 Ibn Rushd, in this case, does not 
provide further explanation as to the slave‟s capacity in marriage. 
For Ibn Rushd, a slave has neither the legal capacity to dispose of 
his wealth nor the right to use and enjoy the advantages or profits 
of another‟s property (usufruct); if he is involved in a transaction, 
his decision will be considered void ab initio.
25
 
Ibn Rushd‟s explanation of bulūgh al-rashid, on the other 
hand, covers extensively men and women of different ages. In 
defining and supporting this idea, the philosopher uses the Qurʾān 
as a moral and legal source. He states that every person has a moral 
obligation to spend his money in accordance with the tenets of 
Islam. God forbids a Muslim to squander his wealth. If necessary, 
God advises Muslims to assign a guardian to protect the wealth 
(māl) of orphans.26 It is undoubtedly from these Qur‟anic passages 
that Ibn Rushd builds his binary opposition between safah and 
rushd, a concept central to his discussion on legal capacity.  
 
1. Categories of maturity (bulūgh) 
In his collection fatwa, Ibn Rushd gives detailed accounts of 
when a free man or woman is to be considered mature (bulūgh). 
For a man to be considered mature or an adult, he must have 
experienced the emission of semen, and for a woman, she must 
have experienced her first menstruation. However, both men and 
women can be considered mature, though they have not yet 
experience the emission of semen or menstruation, if they have 
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shown signs of maturity (beard and mustache in case of men) or 
have reached certain ages.
27
 
Certainly, Muslim jurists have never been in agreement in 
their discussion as to what age someone who has not experienced 
the emission of semen or menstruation is be considered mature. Ibn 
Rushd firmly acknowledges this fact and he restates that jurists 
offer different opinions regarding age; some mark out the limit of 
maturity as fourteen years old, others fifteen years old, while others 
claim seventeen or eighteens years old.
28
 
Likewise, there has also been disagreements among Muslim 
jurists in answering this question: what would be the status of 
someone who has reached the minimum age, but has not dreamed 
yet and has no sign of maturity such as a beard? Would he be 
considered mature? In his response to this question, Ibn Rushd 
mentions that some jurists would consider the person mature 
because he has reached a certain age, while others would answer in 
the negative since there has been no sign as to whether the person 
would be a good person or not. To bridge these two positions, Ibn 
Rushd suggests that we should ask the person whether he has 
experienced any other signs of maturity or not. Her/his answer 
would be our basis for determining whether he/she has matured or 
not.
29
 
As regard to the definition of a healthy mind (ʿaql), the exact 
scope is plain and straightforward: she/he must be able to recognize 
the difference between a beast (al-bahīma) and an insane person 
(al-majnūn), recognize that the quantity of two is greater than one, 
or to acknowledge the indisputable fact that the sky is above us (al-
samāʾ fawqanā) and the earth is under us (al-arḍ taḥtanā).30 
 
2. Relationship between maturity (bulūgh) and responsible 
behavior (bulūgh al-rashid) 
Although Ibn Rushd defines the boundaries of maturity 
(bulūgh), he does not give any detailed explanation as to whether 
someone who is considered mature would have the ability to act in 
a responsible way (bulūgh al-rashid) and would not be considered 
a spendthrift (al-safīh). However, he offers a simple way of 
determining the mature capacity of an individual, that is, by 
looking at the manner in which he spends his wealth; whether it is 
in accordance with the moral basis revealed by the Qurʾān 4:6 or 
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not. The Qurʾān says: “And test the orphans until they attain the 
age of marriage; then if they show responsible behavior, give them 
their goods.” Furthermore, Ibn Rushd explains in detail that there 
were four ways (aqsām) of determining if someone has the ability 
to act in responsible way (bulūgh al-rashid):  
a. If a person is generally known to have the capacity or the 
potential to use his wealth in an extravagant and 
irresponsible way, then he should not be considered 
responsible and therefore should be legally treated in 
accordance with his behavior (ḥāl al-aghlabu min ṣāḥibihā 
al-safah fayaḥkumu lahu fīhā biḥukmuhu).31 
b. If a person is known to be responsible, and will most likely 
continue to be responsible in spending his wealth, then he 
should be legally considered as behaving responsibly (wa in 
ẓahara rashadahu, wa ḥāl al-aghlabu min ṣāḥibihā al-
rashad fayaḥkumu lahu fīhā biḥukmuhu).32 
c. If a person had previously been known to be capable of 
extravagance and irresponsibility in the use of his wealth, 
but it had not yet been formally determined whether he was 
responsible or not, and it is subsequently found that he is 
negligent in his actions, then he should be legally defined as 
irresponsible (wa in ʿalama sufuhahu, wa hāl muḥtamalah 
li al-rashad wa al-safahu, wa al-aẓharu fīhā al-safah 
fayaḥkumu lahu fīhā biḥukmuhu mā lam yaẓhuru 
rashaduhu).
33
 
d. The fourth category of persons is similar to the previous 
one, only he is not negligent in the use of his wealth.  He 
should therefore be legally determined as being responsible 
or accountable (wa ḥāl muḥtamalatu ayḍan li al-rashad wa 
al-safahu, wa illā ẓaharu min ṣaḥibihā  al-rashad 
fayaḥkumu lahu bihi mā lam yaẓhuru safahu).34 
 
In addition to the four categories discussed above, Ibn Rushd 
adds another specific category regarding a person who is deemed 
irresponsible:  if he has not yet matured (al-ṣaghīr), then he cannot 
be considered responsible. In this case, Ibn Rushd explains that 
there was no dispute between Mālik and his associates about the 
legal rights of this person; if the person has not dreamed and 
experienced the emission of semen (man) or menstruation 
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(woman), the person is not legally allowed to rule over his own 
wealth. He does not have the legal capacity to donate his wealth 
(hibah), give to charity (ṣadaqah) and or make any financial 
contracts.
35
 
 
E. Legal Capacity of Women   
The discussion of the legal capacity of women consists of 
many details that would not be found in a discussion on the legal 
capacity of men. The following situations would not allow a 
woman to have legal capacity to act in her own name: a woman 
who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse (al-bakara), a 
woman still under the control of her father or a guardian, a woman 
who has not yet reached menopause (taʾnas) according to the 
opinion of the madhhab from which we derive the limits of 
menopause,
36
 a woman who has not yet married, or a woman who 
is married but the marriage has not yet been consummated. Her 
competence in controlling her wealth and any other acts that have 
legal consequences would thus be contingent on her father or her 
legal guardian.
37
 
Once she reaches maturity, a woman under guardianship is 
required to show how she plans to spend her wealth. If the 
community finds that she has been responsible in her decision, she 
will be considered as having full legal capacity.
38
 On the contrary, 
if the community finds that she is a spendthrift, she will be judged 
as having been irresponsible in her actions and therefore would not 
be accorded legal capacity. However, this order would not be the 
same for a virgin whose father has died and has not assigned her a 
guardian. In such a case, Ibn Rushd explains that there has been no 
consensus on such a situation among Mālik‟s associates (aṣḥāb).39 
Nevertheless, in the cases of a virgin who has not yet been 
judged responsible or not, or of a woman who has reached 
maturity, or of a woman who has married but has not been living 
with her husband according to the minimum period of time as 
derived from the opinion of madhhab, her legal capacity to contract 
or to act in other financial situations would be contingent on her 
father or her husband.
40
 
As for a woman who has been considered responsible and has 
never been a spendthrift, or a virgin who has reached menopause 
according to the opinion of the madhhab from which we derive the 
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limits of menopause, Ibn Rushd offers two opinions: (i) if her 
father or guardian claims that she is not responsible, then she would 
not have the legal capacity to act in any financial and non financial 
contracts; these decisions would remain contingent of her father or 
guardian; (ii) if she is married and has had sexual intercourse  with 
her husband, then she should be considered as having full legal 
capacity.
41
 
 
F. Legal Capacity of Menopause Woman 
It is generally agreed upon that a virgin who has not yet 
experienced her first menstruations cannot be considered as having 
full legal capacity, unless she has reached the age of maturity. 
However, in some conditions, a menopausal woman (taʾnas) can 
have legal capacity and be permitted to act on her own behalf. 
Although there has been some disagreement among Muslim jurists 
as to when a woman can be considered menopausal, Ibn Rushd 
tries to present the conditions in three categories: 
 
1. If she has a father 
The legal status of a woman who lives under the protection of 
her father until her marriage, and whose husband has consummated 
the marriage, is determined by the husband. If her husband knows 
that she would be responsible in her actions, then she can get out 
from under her father‟s guard and be considered mature and 
responsible. She will also be legally permitted to spend her wealth. 
Conversely, if her husband finds that she has been irresponsible in 
her use of wealth, she will not be considered mature. Similarly, a 
woman who is living with her father, is married and whose husband 
has consummated the marriage, but has not reached menopause, 
and has never been a spendthrift, could be considered mature and 
responsible.
42
 
In determining the minimum age of menopause (taʾnas), Ibn 
Rushd notes that there has been no agreement among Muslim 
jurists. While some say forty years old, others set the minimum age 
at fifty or sixty years old. The opinion of Mālik, however, was that 
if she remained with her father, her actions would not be 
considered valid without her father‟s consent, unless she has 
reached the age of menopause.
43
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The following discussion will be more complex as we look at 
the situation of a woman who is living with her father and has been 
married for less than one year. In such a case, Ibn Rushd is of the 
opinion that the legal status of the woman to act on her own is 
withheld for one year to three years, depending on the jurist, before 
she can be considered mature and responsible. During this interim 
period, she will not be permitted to engage in any transaction or 
contract. Decisions made during this waiting time can be revoked. 
Only after this period has passed can she obtain legal capacity. In 
addition, she is also required to show that she is capable of 
responsible behavior, thus proving maturity and responsibility.
44
 
In the case of a woman whose husband has died before the 
one, two or three-year anniversary, depending on which timeframe 
is considered valid, Ibn Rushd offers two opinions: first, if she has 
married, regardless of the length of marriage, she will be 
considered fully capable in all her decision; second, if she has 
married and her husband dies, she must return to her father if her 
father is still alive.
45
 
 
2. If her father had assigned a guardian prior to his death 
The legal capacity of a woman whose father had assigned her 
a guardian before his death, since she was known to be extravagant 
and irresponsible in spending his wealth, or in the case of a court 
assigning her a guardian after the death of her father, remains with 
her guardian. Even if she has married and is accompanied by her 
husband, her guardian retains control of her wealth, unless she has 
proven that she is responsible (rushd).
46
 
 
3. If she is an orphan 
In the case of an orphan - if she has a guardian assigned by 
her father or assigned by the court, or if she has been married for a 
long period of time and her husband has had sexual intercourse 
with her, or if she has reached menopause - she cannot release 
herself from her guardian unless the guardian release her. 
According to Ibn Rushd, this is a well known opinion among 
Mālikī jurists (hadhā huwa al-mashhūr fī al-madhhab). 47 The less 
popular opinion, however, according to Ibn Rushd, says that once 
she reaches menopause or marries, she should be allowed to free 
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herself from her guardian and be permitted to act on her own 
behalf.
48
 
In the case of an orphan who has no guardian assigned to her 
by her father, Ibn Rushd offers two further opinions. The first, 
which is held by Saḥnūn, says that once she has reached maturity 
and experienced menstruation, her actions can be considered 
legitimate. The second, in contrast, posits that unless she has 
reached menopause (taʾnas), she will not considered as having 
legal capacity for any of her actions.
49
 
Jurists of the medieval period, as Ibn Rushd informs us, never 
reached a consensus as to what age a woman can be considered 
menopausal. Here, Ibn Rushd lists supplementary opinions: some 
jurists are said to believe that the period of menopause begins after 
thirty years of age, while others emphasized forty years, and some 
others gave a range of between fifty to sixty years. Another 
argument claims that regardless of her age, if she has been with her 
husband for one to three years, depending on which one we 
consider to be legitimate, then she can be regarded as in a similar 
position as a menopausal woman and therefore all her actions 
should be considered legal.
50
 
 
G. Legal Capacity of Man 
Unlike our previous discussion concerning the legal capacity 
of a woman, the legal capacity of a man is less complex.  Muslim 
jurists had come to an agreement that a young man who is not 
mature and is still under the protection of his father would not have 
the legal capacity to donate (hibah) or conclude any financial 
contract without his father‟s consent. Once he has reached maturity, 
he may fall in one of three categories: First, if he is known to be 
sound of mind and has been responsible in spending his wealth, 
then he should be considered responsible or rushd.
51
Second, if he is 
usually known to be extravagant in spending his wealth, and should 
he be determined to continue this behavior, then he is be considered 
irresponsible or safah.
52
Third, if it has not been determined 
whether he is responsible or extravagant, then there are two 
possibilities. In one case, an observation of his behavior will lead to 
a determination of whether he has been responsible for his wealth 
or not. This opinion, according to Ibn Rushd, is held by Yaḥyā, 
from Ibn al-Qāsim in his book al-Ṣadaqāt wa al-hibāt, who said 
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that if the man has been responsible, he must be considered mature 
and should not remain under his father or guardian‟s supervision, 
unless there is reason to believe otherwise.
53
 
The second opinion maintains that as long as the man has not 
been wasteful, he should be allowed to act alone in all of his 
transactions. If he is found to be excessive and irresponsible, then 
his father or guardian has the right to intervene. According to Ibn 
Rushd, this is the opinion of Mālik, which was reported by Ziyād, 
and has been clearly stated in the Mudawwana of Saḥnūn.54 
In the case of a man whose father has died, and who himself 
has not yet matured (bulūgh), but the court has assigned him a 
guardian, then the guardian will take on the role of his father. 
However, if he has reached maturity and has been responsible 
(rushd), who can release him from the guardian‟s control? 
According to Ibn Zarab, if the guardian was assigned by qāḍī, then 
only the qāḍīhas the right to release him from the guardian.55 Some 
jurists are reported to have said that the man is permitted (jāʾiz) to 
release himself from his guardian once he has reach maturity, while 
others claim that the man should not be permitted to release himself 
from his guardian unless he has proven that he is responsible for his 
wealth.
56
 
If a father had assigned him a guardian before his death, Ibn 
Rushd, following Ibn al-Qāsim in his Kitāb al-wāṣiyā al-Ūla, says 
that he does not specifically need a qāḍī‟s decision to release 
himself once he has matured and has been responsible in all his 
action. In the absence of a qāḍī‟s decision, however, he still needs 
someone to release him from his guardian.
57
 
 
H. Interjection and relations between guardian and ward 
In the corpus of Islamic law, there has been massive debate 
over whether someone who is considered irresponsible, 
extravagant, or a spendthrift (al-safīh) should be under interdiction 
or not.
58
 Al-Shāfiʿī, for example, in his Kitāb al-Umm held the 
position that the irresponsible or the spendthrift, because of its 
similar ʿilla with the minor, should be interjected.59 Mālik and the 
two disciples of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī were also 
reported to have denied the rights of the safah to formalize 
contracts and buying or selling without the prior consent of his 
guardian.
60
 Abū Ḥanīfa, on the contrary, was reportedly against the 
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decision to intervene the spendthrift because he considered the act 
of the interdiction or the denial of legal capacity as more harmful to 
the person than his own irresponsible acts.
61
 Ibn Rushd, however, 
as we have seen from the foregoing discussion, was on the side of 
Muslim jurists who supported the interjection. His fatwā on legal 
capacity and his discussion of the categories of the responsible and 
irresponsible in spending someone‟s wealth reflect his strong 
position on interdiction and the necessity of assigning a guardian. 
In the following paragraph, I shall discuss how Ibn Rushd 
explains the relationship between a guardian and his ward, to what 
extend a guardian has a right to intervene in his ward‟s activities, 
and what action can legally be taken by a ward without the prior 
consent of his guardian. 
Although the term safah has a broad meaning, as seen in the 
discussion on legal capacity, Ibn Rushd employed the term safah to 
refer to the Qur‟anic competency of spending wealth. We have also 
noted that Ibn Rushd did not recognize any legal capacity to those 
he considered irresponsible, spendthrifts or any other related term 
of safah. However, Ibn Rushd emphasizes that in the case of 
rituals, someone who is considered safah has the same the capacity 
of obligationsuch as fasting and praying as someone who is 
considered mature, responsible, and in possession of a perfect mind 
(kamāl ʿaql and bulugh al-rashid) except for the minor and the 
insane. He can also be punished (qiṣāṣ) if he commits a  wrong.62 
Beyond the issue of the Qur‟anic morality of spending 
wealth, Ibn Rushd recognizes that someone who is considered 
safah, whether under guardianship or not, can still be allowed to 
engage in some legalactivities. In some cases of guardianship, the 
guardian may intervene him, although there has been no clear cut 
position on this legal question.  For example, a person who is 
considered safah still has the right to divorce (ṭalāq) his wife 
without the consent of his guardian, and his action will remain 
valid. Likewise, he also has the right to manumit a slave („ataqa).63 
However, in other cases, Ibn Rushd quoted Muḥammad Ibn 
al Mawāz as saying that if the person engages in activities that will 
result in any financial consequences in his life, such as donations 
(hibah), charity (ṣadaqah), or even manumitment of a slave, 
(„ataqa), he will have to ask permission from his guardian. This 
implies that the guardian will analyse whether his ward‟s decision 
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would significantly affect his life or not. If the guardian finds that 
his decision will negatively impact his life, the guardian can 
intervene him. Nevertheles, if the person  receives financial 
benefits from others, for example, a creditor forgives him his debt, 
he can legally accept it without the consent of his guardian.
64
 
In the case of divorce, due to the financial responsibility it 
may resulted in, Ibn Rushd mentions a significant difference among 
Muslim jurists on whether a safih is still responsible for the 
payment of his wife‟s expenses. The first argument, held by Mālik, 
posits that although the person is considered a safih, he would 
never be discharged from his obligation to pay his due to his wife. 
On the contrary, the second argument holds that the husband is not 
responsible to pay his due because he is under the supervision of 
someone else. A third argument requires an analysis of the person‟s 
financial situation.  If the person has the capacity to pay his due, he 
must pay. However, if he has very limited financial freedom, then 
he is not obliged to pay his due.
65
 Ibn Rushd indicates that the third 
argument has become the opinion of the majority of jurists. 
However, he does not explicitly mention which position he himself 
held.   
 The relationship between a guardian and his ward became 
more complex as the Cordoban qāḍī faced further marital issues. 
One case brought before him considered the following problem: 
what happens when a person, who is considered safah and has a 
guardian, has married a woman without the consent of his guardian 
and then dies? The question requiring his fatwā is how the guardian 
ought to consider the wife of his ward, who by law is allowed to 
inherit from her husband. In regards to this specific problem, Ibn 
Rushd offers three answers: the first says she does not inherit, 
unless she has had sexual relations with her husband; the second 
says she can undoubtedly inherit; and the third says that she has a 
right to inherit, but the guardian must look at the marital situation. 
That is to say, if the marriage was acceptable, she would be able 
inherit.
66
 
Another problematic case brought before Ibn Rushd was 
whether a guardian could force his ward to marry without the 
latter‟s approval. Again, in answering this question, Ibn Rushd 
offers two answers: the first says that the guardian cannot force his 
ward to marry without his consent, and the second says the 
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guardian can force his ward to marry regardless of the ward‟s 
consent.
67
 
Likewise, in the case of divorce between the person who is 
considered safah and his wife, similar questions were brought 
before him. Does a guardian have the right to divorce his ward‟s 
wife? Again, Ibn Rushd does not specifically answer this question. 
One position claims that the guardian has the right to divorce his 
ward‟s wife, but another insists that the guardian does not have 
such a right.
68
 
 
I. Conclusion and Remarks 
After reading Ibn Rushd and his selected fatwā, we can gain 
some conclusion which may enrich our understanding of Ibn Rushd 
and his legal discourse. First, Ibn Rushd neither begins his 
discussion on legal capacity from an abstract idea, nor does he 
mention the term legal capacity in his selected fatwa. However, 
from the general concern surrounding the circumstances in which a 
person is to be allowed (jawwaza) to dispose of his/her wealth, he 
discusses the issue of legal capacity, and that discussion has 
included the capacity to acquire rights and duties and the capacity 
of execution as indicated by Schacht. 
It is also obvious that Ibn Rushd refers to the Qurʾān as the 
main source of his exploration of legal capacity. He has expanded 
the meaning of term safah, which the Qurʾān only uses to address 
the situation of minors and orphans, into a more general moral and 
legal concept of spending wealth. In this context, Ibn Rushd has 
created the binary opposition between safah and rushd. In order to 
define who is considered safah and rushd, Ibn Rushd, though not in 
any systematic order, has classified the capacity of men and 
women, as well as menopausal women.  Broadening the application 
of these two terms, safah and rushd, from orphans and minors to 
men and women in general, Ibn Rushd supports the idea of 
extending interjection and guardianship to anyone who is 
considered irresponsible.  
Second, it is interesting to note that although in some way Ibn 
Rushd does not specifically define his juristic position, he remains 
consistent with the standard teaching of Mālik and his associates. 
In some of his discussions on the legal capacity of women for 
example, he refers to the authority of Ibn al-Qāsim and Saḥnūn as 
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the reliable source of the Mālikī school of law. On occasion, Ibn 
Rushd also mentions his agreement with the widely accepted 
opinion (mashhūr) in the madhhab, without specifically mentioning 
any authoritative names. In the case where Ibn Rushd does not 
explicitly mention his juristic position, he only offers various 
arguments within the Mālikī school of law and lets his readers to 
choose any legal position. In this case, Ibn Rushd provides room 
for disagreement (ikhtilāf), which is highly beneficial for the 
survival and flexibility of Islamic legal concepts. 
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